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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a reflexion on euthanasia using personal experience 
and philosophical references. Our goal is to present some aspects of this topic but not to say 
what to think or what to do. We hope it will give the debate a good introduction1.  
In what follows, the term euthanasia must be understood as being the act of ending, at his 
request, the life of an adult (or emancipated minor), who is able to decide for himself, 
suffering from a serious incurable condition (illness or accident) and experiencing constant 
and unbearable physical or psychological suffering. This request will be repeated with calm, 
and without any external pressure. The act will be carried out by a third party, in the case 
considered here, a doctor. It is important to specify that the doctor can refuse to carry out 
euthanasia and that in addition no one is forced to participate if it is against his morals or 
conscience. 
The Belgian law of 28 May 2002, published at the same time as the law on palliative care and 
the law relating to patients’ rights, imposes more obligations (1). The most pertinent ones 
concluded in giving the patient all information, particularly in relation to palliative care, 
obtaining the opinion of a second or even third doctor (in the case of unforeseeable short-
term death), and making sure that all persons designated by the patient have been met 
beforehand. The legal text does not specify the practical medical methods (this is not its 
role), but these are accessible and have been published many times. It is useful to specify 
that the legal text avoids the notion of medically assisted suicide, and that the stage of the 
condition (“terminal phase,” “palliative phase,” “end of life”) has been removed. By 
adapting the second proposal, it echoes opinion issued by the Belgian Bioethics Consultative 
Committee on 12 May 1997 (2). As a reminder, the essential question posed by the BBCC 
was: “Is it appropriate to legislate on the subject of euthanasia?” which resulted in 4 
proposals: A complete decriminalisation of euthanasia (The practice of euthanasia is freely 
accepted), a “a posteriori” regulation (The act is declared after its completion),  a “a priori” 
regulation (A commission decides before if the act is legally acceptable) and a complete 
Status quo (no change of legal framework). 
                                                 
1 Some references are taken from book written in French or translated from other languages in French. 
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Since its implementation, the Federal Commission for Evaluation and Control has published 
the conclusions detailing the declarations of the doctors who have carried out euthanasia. 
All the data are available (3).  
We shall not go into details about the history of the Belgian legislation on this theme, but it 
should be remembered that we had to wait many years before the subject could be debated 
in Parliament, that it was needed a conversion of the majority so the historic veto be lifted. 
The debate was rich, contradictory, pluralist, with both sides being heard and many 
different opinions expressed, resulting in the present-day text. This text was based, should it 
be noted, on legal proposals such as those of Roger Lallemand or Edouard Klein (invariably 
rejected...) or on the texts of Professor Yvon Kenis, co-founder of ADMD (Association for the 
Right to Die with Dignity), who wrote about the legal proposal: “It is not ideologically 
oriented, as it takes no position about the direction of life or about the hereafter. It deals only 
with real cases of unbearable suffering and denounces the prejudice whereby death must be 
preceded by a long and cruel agony. (...) Should one not sacrifice the duration of life for its 
quality that a patient wishes to retain until the end?” Such foresight and such sense of the 
issue could only demand respect.  
Although some oppose euthanasia and palliative care (similarly to the therapeutic 
obstinacy), this Manichean position is absurd both semantically and in practice. How can 
we say that medicine is capable of alleviating all physical, mental or moral suffering? In 
Belgium, where, should it be noted, all euthanasia must be the subject of a declaration to a 
Control Commission, it can be observed that most of the patients having requested and 
obtained euthanasia had previously benefited from palliative care. A recent study by a 
VUB (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) team confirms that decisions, taken within a 
multidisciplinary framework regarding euthanasia and assisted suicide, did not restrict 
the practice of palliative care (4). Evidently, this will not doubt its qualities, but its 
limitations. We have many times received patients, referred by doctors working in 
palliative-care units, who maintained their request for euthanasia despite the efforts and 
undeniable competence of our colleagues. These patients recognised the quality of the 
care, the support, the listening, the appropriate monitoring of pain in these units, but 
could not tolerate to be made to feel guilty, either because their request was refused in the 
name of precepts to which they did not subscribe, or because a so-called “controlled” 
sedation was proposed to them as an alternative. This solution eludes both the patient’s 
request and the real meaning of the action that is carried out. In effect, far from being 
“controlled,” this sedation only prolongs the agony and if death occurs prematurely, some 
health professionals mention the double-effect phenomenon (result of an act that was not 
part of their intention). Of course, there are circumstances in which it would be better to 
sedate a patient in order to spare him a painful death, such as in the case of terminal 
dyspnoea or the threat of a haemorrhage. This ties in with both compassion and ethics. 
This is well described in the book “Principles of biomedical ethics of Beauchamp and 
Childress2, (5). By contrary, if this sedation is proposed as an “alternative” to euthanasia, 
it is an intellectually inappropriate process that is aimed merely at appeasing the 
practitioner’s conscience. To deliberately sedate a patient in the name of his comfort is not 
a harmless act. We know the risks involved in the administration of sedatives in the 
context of precarious medical situations. The side effects and complications inherent in 
                                                 
2 This book is a reference in terms of ethics and is highly recommended. 
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this practice are most often irreversible. To claim that, in this case, the sedation is 
“controlled” displays a lack of honesty, as death very often occurs within 72 hours (6), (7). 
From all the evidence, the “palliative filter” that some would impose on all patients 
requesting euthanasia is neither a medical nor an ethical guarantee... 
The other fear advanced by opponents is that of by-products, of the “slippery slope.” This 
would be nothing more or less than mass killings, carried out for social reasons (the poor), 
economic reasons (the elderly), or medical reasons (the very ill, the disabled, the mentally 
ill), implying that by legislating, and by legalizing euthanasia, the legislature would enable 
health professionals to feel free to act without constraint. By all evidence this is hugely 
contrary, as if a law would supplant all moral reflection, all ethical analysis. In effect, it is 
like saying that doctors generally work without “conscience” and that only the law (“which 
forbids euthanasia”) protects patients from arbitrary decisions taken by their doctors while 
at the same time these detractors, opposed to all legislation, claim for example that no 
doctor wants to carry out euthanasia. This is another undisputed manifestation of the 
manipulation of opinion and bad faith, based on lies. Neither Belgian nor Dutch 
experiences, which provide official data, have led to the by-products mentioned. On the 
contrary, since 2002, there has been no “explosion” of euthanasia or similar acts, in Belgium. 
All patients had a long and hard medical past, thus demonstrating their will to fight as long 
as possible against the disease. (For more details, see  reference 3) 
The approach adopted by Jean-Yves Goffi (pp 29-42) on the theme of the “slippery slope” is 
among the most interesting (8). For him, those who fear this ineluctable by-product “in fact 
demonstrate their inability to perceive the imperceptible, and their argument is made at the 
cost of a certain number of confusions regarding arbitrary attributions of causal 
relationships.” Their systematic references to Nazism is furthermore an error in evaluating 
the problem and the erroneous attribution of the same term (“euthanasia”) to two 
completely different situations, namely a political choice on the one hand and an individual 
choice on the other. Should we say that the Nazi Party usurped many symbols and themes, 
turning them away from their initial function. 
J-Y Goffi continues by clarifying “that we must revise downwards the claims of the 
argument (of the slippery slope), which is reduced to recording the fact...that the use of 
certain concepts in ethics is particularly delicate and can lead to abusive interpretations.” 
For our part, we would add that this “Newtonian” vision of risks (slope, etc.) is related to a 
heuristic sense of fear and has no place in rational medical practice. It eludes the moral sense 
of patients and doctors and at the same time condones the adherence of the masses to 
genocidal behaviour. 
The work of J-Y Goffi  certainly deserves paragraph, both for its originality and for its 
relevance. His chapter “Euthanasia and virtues” is in this case a very good demonstration 
on the subject, tackling it by means of virtues, of consequentialism, of aretism (virtue ethics). 
He concludes, but without really concluding: “In exceptional although inevitable 
circumstances, death can become a desirable end; and the most virtuous attitude consists of 
assisting others to pursue this end.”). 
Finally, it must be repeated that from what we know of the issue, carrying out euthanasia is 
not an ordinary act and is never done emotionless. No doctor desires to carry out 
euthanasia, but when his patient’s request is clear, when the issue is declared as unbearable 
for the patient, helping him to die without suffering, sparing him a painful and pointless 
agony, assumes such a human dimension that refusing to carry out this act would be still, 
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much more painful. Refusal is in our view a desperate exhibition of the doctor’s existential 
anguish much more than a proof of respect for deontology and ethics. The only valid 
argument advanced is an argument with moral value, very often with religious 
connotations. But then, what value does it give to the suffering of the patient? How far must 
this suffering go so that the patient would be listened? For how long? 
A question remains unanswered: is it conceivable to consider that patients die without 
dignity when the euthanasia they requested is refused. In our opinion, undoubtedly yes. As 
long as a patient makes a request for euthanasia that complies with the legal framework 
(conscious and competent patient with incurable condition, suffering that cannot be eased, 
repeated request), to refuse him in the name of personal moral or philosophical principles 
without proposing a solution that satisfies the patient (suggesting another doctor for 
example, as set forth by law) consists of no longer recognizing the patient’s dignity and of 
protecting the doctor’s conscience, which takes precedence for him over the wishes of his 
patient. Although no doctor is constrained to carry out an euthanasia, to place the person 
who requests it in an impasse is an attack on respect for this person and his independence, 
using him as a tool for one’s own morals, for one’s own conscience, “denying” personal 
dignity. This argument is, in our view, fundamental for considering the act of euthanasia not 
only as a respectful act, full of humanity, but also as the unconditional recognition of the 
dignity of the patient.  
In a context of medical practice, respectful for the patient, the ethics in force take priority 
over the doctor’s personal morals, even if these are overturned. Despite the difficulty in 
transgressing certain moral concepts, in particular religious ones, health professionals 
must refer to the ethical values of the moment, considering that the decision to be taken is 
the “least bad” one for the patient. Paula La Marne (pp 116-117), in the conclusion of her 
book on “Ethics and the End of Life,” writes: “Nothing can prevent someone from choosing 
his death, provided that this choice is firm and clear, and that the doctor is sure of this.” 
(9) She insists on the importance of developing palliative care, and mentions the fact that 
patients requesting death are rare. But the notion of “rarity” is not synonym with 
insignificance. To help one, two or five patients has no countable value in my eyes. These 
are major events in the life of a doctor, events that cannot be neglected and that are more 
than simple statistics. It is at these moments that clinical experience, but also wisdom and 
respect for others, cannot be subjugated to a current of dominant thought, to diktats that 
suppress dialogue. The words used by Bernard Baertschi are clearly along these lines: 
“...euthanasia appears to be an ultimate means of satisfying the aims of moral enterprise: 
leading a happy life, or at least preventing it from becoming radically unhappy or even 
worse infra-personal.” (10)    
We have met many patients who have spoken  of their suffering, of their wish, not to go 
beyond a certain limit that they have fixed, who have asked us “calmly and repeatedly” to 
be present at the last moment and to help them to leave with dignity, their dignity. For all 
these people, we think that we have acted in the best way possible with the feeling that the 
act carried out was what had to be done. At this moment, concepts of dignity, independence 
and ethics were all present, but free of any passion or sterile rhetoric. In medicine, there is 
no “right time” to start asking questions about the meaning of what one is doing. It is a 
reflection of each moment which certainly becomes richer over time, but which can never be 
carried over to the next day. A little experience is worth much more than any blind 
certitude. 
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2. Dignity - morality 
An universal term, of which we speak a lot, but for which, when you think about it, there is 
no definition that really satisfies or at least for which there is no disagreement depending on 
points of view. 
Dignity is sometimes linked to virtue, to a certain social class (“dignitaries”), sometimes to 
an attitude, to a bearing (“a noble and dignified allure”), sometimes to respect for the 
autonomy of the person (“retaining self-esteem despite adversity”), sometimes to the 
inherited quality of the individual (“the fact of being simply a human being”). Among these 
different concepts, how do we interpret the notion of dignity in medical practice? For some, 
like Ruth Macklin, the notion of dignity appears even useless or at least should not be 
evoked in medicine. In an article published in 2003, she writes that it is a bad use of the 
term, in the place of “respect for individuals and their independence, which concerns 
essentially obtaining the informed consent, respecting the confidentiality, and the need to 
avoid abusive discrimination.” While radical, this argument should not be accepted as it is 
and should even be reassessed. (11) 
One can, according to Roberto Andorno, distinguish between an inherited, “static,” 
intangible, immutable dignity that is present in the “being,” and a “dynamic” dignity, which 
is present in the “acting.” (12) In any case, it can be seen that dignity remains an absolute 
concept that exists only because of what derives from it and therefore, because of its 
universal character, is unalienable whatever the circumstances. 
Consequently, expressions such as “a life worth living” or “a dignified death” are in 
themselves meaningless as dignity cannot be lost; this can depend only on the person 
(independence, respect). 
It can be understood that as a concept, dignity can be limited to one of these aspects alone 
and that a reductive approach leads to confusion. We must therefore be clear about the 
terms. In the opinion of Bernard Baertschi, it is possible to tackle the question as follows: 
dignity is a question of “morality” (what one does), a “personal” question (what one 
undergoes), and a “human” question (what one is). On the other hand, indignity is 
evidently related to humiliation and using people as tools. All these elements coexist in 
everyone, but without any one affecting the others. This ranges from self-esteem to the 
image that one projects of oneself to others. There is often a moral sense that will give either 
a respectable image, or a feeling of shame or remorse in relation to what one has done: theft, 
lies, insults. There is the personal dimension, which can be noble, but can also cause a 
feeling of debasement as is the case with mutilating or degenerative conditions, in the case 
of pain or when a patient is placed in a situation of inferiority with clear comparative 
strength: i.e. patients infantilised. These two dimensions do not relate to the third, the one 
that is most often the issue during ethical debates and that is at the centre of the Declaration 
of Human Rights. 
This is the human sense of the concept of dignity, which cannot in principle be lost, unlike 
the first two. That said, it is evident that there are no clear boundaries between moral sense, 
personal sense and human sense; on the contrary, the existing interconnections justify the 
term dignity as a concept. Thus an act that is undignified in the moral sense of the term will 
detrimentally affect human dignity: the act of one who lies or steals, or who uses others as a 
means in human experimentation without consent, or torture. However, nothing that 
anyone does or undergoes deprives him of his human dignity; but the latter may be violated 
or ridiculed. 
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A person physically and/or morally violated or ridiculed will feel humiliated, used as a 
tool, according to Kant’s first imperative: “Act so that you treat humanity as well in your 
person as in the person of all others always at the same time as an end, and never as a 
means.” This philosopher in his time discarded the foundations of contemporary morality 
and his works remain references for the occidental philosophy, particularly with regard to 
the human person, even if one could reproach him for imposing only reason as a 
fundamental element of morality. Kant ‘s “Categorical imperatives” remain the bedrock of 
many arguments. 
Using people as tools and humiliation thus represent major attacks on human dignity and 
are by their nature unethical. Can such attacks be observed in medical practice? 
Recent history has shown us the degree of ignominy that certain doctors have attained, 
especially during the Second World War: experiments without the aim of progress, without 
improving treatment, brutality, refinement of torture, contempt for humans in the name of a 
nauseating ideology.  
We think that one must consider dignity, in the sense of not using humans as tools or 
humiliating them, as an essential element enshrined in medical practice. These are nuances 
permitted by rhetoric, but in the particular case of a patient, these nuances appear highly 
relative. The feeling of humiliation in fact relates more to an attack on self-image - “personal 
dignity” - than an attack on “human dignity,” but for the person concerned there is no 
difference. He feels unbearably affected, which is how one measures that which degradates 
or injures. To tell him that his “dignity” is intact, that there is no reason to feel humiliated, is 
at the same time a semantic error and above all a clear lack of common sense. 
However, some would argue the contrary by claiming that one must make a distinction 
between relative (or moral or personal) dignity and absolute (human) dignity, as an 
alteration of the first does not affect the second, even going so far as to evoke camp 
prisoners to justify their suggestions: “...their immense eyes that truly express beauty, the 
dignity of the human being that no offence, no cruelty...can reduce.” These same arguments 
are sometimes used to claim that palliative care provides the only response that is humanly 
“dignified” in response to the “anguished claim for the right to die with dignity”! (13) It can 
be understood that this semantic game is not innocent, that it can serve as fertile ground for 
opponents of the decriminalisation of euthanasia and moreover that it is manipulative, 
removing the patient from the debate without telling him.  
In medicine, the respect must go beyond the patient’s independence, sparing him the 
shame, the humiliation, the feeling of being used as a tool, that is by recognizing his dignity 
as conceived by him.  
Dignity has a multidimensional value, which is part of the individual history of a person 
who cannot be understood by one of its aspects alone. By being rhetorical about a concept, 
the latter ends up being empty of meaning. In other words, we must consider the patient 
individually and assist him without imposing on him moral standards that do not stand up 
to reality and bring difficulties and conflicts when taking decisions.  
3. Independence - self-determination 
Absent from the Hippocratic Oath (it is interesting to note on this subject that Hippocrates 
did not take into account the patient’s point of view when drafting his oath), the patient’s 
independence is however part of the ethical code. This independence defines our capacity to 
choose our lifestyle, our behaviour and our values, but cannot be at the cost of moral and 
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ethical reflection. To respect individual independence is to respect the basis of free, 
informed, advanced consent, essential before any experimentation (the Nuremberg Code, 
the Declaration of Helsinki, the Belmont Report), is to ensure that the patient is involved in 
decision-making processes, that he understands the information given to him. 
The doctor cannot decide for the patient, even if the latter does not make the best choice 
from a medical point of view. A patient suffering from pancreatic cancer in an inoperable 
stage may, for example, refuse chemotherapy even if encouraging results are presented to 
him, and prefer exclusively palliative care. Treatment must be oriented in accordance with 
the patient’s objectives and priorities. The situation can be more complex in the case of an 
unconscious patient. If the latter was not able to make his wishes known beforehand 
(advance declaration), the doctor has to judge whether the care provided will bring relief, or 
even an improvement, of the clinical situation. Bioethical principles are then to be taken into 
account while obviously avoiding therapeutic obstinacy, which can be condemned as an 
unethical attitude. If arrangements have been made beforehand, they must be respected. 
In the case of a weakened patient, made vulnerable by illness or an accident, the situation 
also requires many precautions, mutual confidence and confidentiality. The patient goes to 
his doctor in the hope that the latter will act in his best interests and will respect his dignity. 
This is the case of patients suffering from a progressive disease of which certain 
complications may alter their judgement capacity.  
One can see independence as a risk of harming, if circumstances impair the patient’s full 
judgement, if his freedom to judge is no longer really so, hence the importance, in good time, 
of dialogue and expression of the wishes of the patient, who has furthermore been duly 
informed of his condition. It remains the question of free choice, of due abandonment of the 
paternalistic position of medical ethics in favour of an autonomist model. (14) (Marzano pp 
23-24) 
In a very complete work on ethics and the end of life, Paula La Marne (9) evokes the 
principle of independence by clarifying that this is the indispensable, reasonable condition 
of dialogue with the patient, the latter clarifying his conceptions of a valid existence in 
relation to his body and maintaining his life. The doctor’s benevolence, however noble, 
should not have a bearing on the patient’s freedom, which is nothing more or less than a 
fundamental right. “The duty of compassion (Agape, brotherly love), etc.) on the doctor’s part 
encompasses respecting the patient’s choices (respecting his independence). It is the patient 
who has the last word,” she writes in chapter II concerning “Face to face with therapeutic 
obstinacy and euthanasia.”  
In order for there to be independence, there must obviously be appropriate information, 
ensuring free, informed and conscious consent on the part of the patient. Consequently, the 
patient may choose what he sees fit: treatment, intervention (specific or experimental), or 
refusal of care.  
The patient’s independence is more a starting point than an end point, thus condemning all 
paternalism. The ever more frequent use of “information forms” in clinical studies, protocols 
or interventions is one of the most obvious manifestations of this. It remains to clarify what 
takes precedence depending on the case, taking into account that the doctor must respect the 
patient’s dignity as well as his independence (his self-determination), without forgetting the 
three other main principles of bioethics, namely: doing good, not doing bad, and 
(distributive) justice, as presented by Beauchamp and Childress.  
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4. And to continue... 
In particular, it will be necessary to demonstrate that carrying out euthanasia, within an 
established framework as set forth by (Belgian) law, is neither an exception nor an ethical 
transgression. 
Opponents of euthanasia advance arguments rooted sometimes in 
1. religious precepts (“Thou shall not kill”), sometimes in  
2. Kantian categorical imperatives and deontologism, sometimes resting on  
3. the slippery slope argument (see above), or even on the fact that  
4. carrying out euthanasia is in total contradiction of practising the art of healing (“Killing 
a patient is immoral,” “I didn’t do my studies for that,” etc.), that it contradicts  
5. the Hippocratic oath “Do not prescribe or counsel a lethal product” Art. 4), that  
6. euthanasia is suicide in disguise. 
7. A law will give an absolute power to the doctor. 
While one can understand these arguments, again they must be considered at a supra-
personal level, which places the opponents in a decision-making impasse, obliging them 
literally to abandon the patient in need. We think that for each of these arguments, it is 
possible to demonstrate that they have been advanced wrongly or at least that they lie in 
the field of meta-ethics. So as not to lengthen the text, we propose to deal with each of 
them in the discussion by setting against them the counter-argument that I consider most 
relevant. 
1. The adage advanced is of course respectable, but it has never prevented anyone from 
killing his neighbour, nor prevented conflicts, nor of course religious wars. And here 
also, the word “kill” is loaded with meaning and does not relate to clinical reality. 
Moreover, we find in the founding texts writings that mention assistance to die with 
compassion... 
2. As mentioned earlier, the act of acceding to a request for assistance to die in a precise 
context is not in contradiction of a Kantian imperative. I will repeat in particular that 
not respecting a patient’s wishes is in itself an attack on his dignity.  
3. The “slippery slope” is an argument that has its limits and in this case is advanced 
wrongly. To mention the risk of the slippery slope is indirectly to demonstrate the 
inability to react faced with what would be ineluctable. Belgian experience 
demonstrates that there is no slope and that nothing slips... 
4. Assisting a patient until the end of his life is an integral part of care. Preferring 
“natural” death to medical aid that guarantees comfort is dubious. Imagining that 
nature will be more moral that health professionals shows a lack of grasp of the subject. 
In addition, the semantics used are among the most biased: “Put to death,” “Kill,” 
“Terminate,” etc.) 
5. The reference to the Hippocratic Oath is habitual but forgets that this text has been 
“transgressed” for a long time (abortion, surgery, etc.). Likewise its text must be read as 
a set of ethics for life and not for death. Furthermore, the recourse to “poison” concerns 
essentially suicide, condemned by the Pythagoreans, and not assistance to die. 
6. Analysis of actual cases experienced shows that a request for euthanasia is clearly 
different from suicide, in its conceptualisation by the patient, in what motivates the 
decision, and in its execution.  
7. Because of a law, discussion about end-of-life is now open without clandestinity and a 
law will never erase or avoid professional consciensciousness. 
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These various points are not exhaustive and should be subjected to more in-depth analysis, 
but that lies outside the scope of this work. 
5. Veil of ignorance... 
Every day brings its new set of declarations. On reading the “collective” work of Luc Ferry 
and Axel Kahn (16) one cannot help but be struck by the lack of acuity and even intellectual 
honesty with regard to the subject of euthanasia. Coming from such respectable and 
influential people, this is worrying. Ferry speaks among other things of a “supposed 
humanitarian act that consists of killing...” Kahn considers that “euthanasia is a 
transgression of the law,” and that “the “Leonetti law” avoids transgressive euthanasia.” 
Although in meta-ethical matters one must above all analyse statements logically and 
reflectively, abstaining from all moral judgement, such comments are in my view highly 
debatable and very far from an approach in line with cases actually experienced (casuistic 
ethics, etc.).  
After reading this work, we wondered whether one could not apply John Rawls’s famous 
theory of justice and the fiction of the veil of ignorance to reflect on the question of the 
decriminalisation of euthanasia (17). Of course, Rawls is thinking first of all of the 
functioning of institutions and the practices of contemporary societies. However, why not 
do the exercise of searching on the one hand for what represents an equal right for everyone 
to access the broadest set of fundamental liberties (compatible with a set of liberties for all) 
and on the other hand how to respect social and economic inequalities, and make it such 
that they are not an obstacle to personal choices. 
Still with Rawls, and considering his 1992 “u-turn,” the “consensus by overlapping” would 
also enable the various moral principles found in our plural societies to be brought together. 
As pointed out by Ludivine Thiaw-Po-Une (pp 1063-1071), “moral disagreements do not 
result from the irrationality of some or other persons. They are rather the inevitable result of 
the exercise of reason in conditions of liberty.” 
To resort to the fiction of the “veil of ignorance” does obviously not mean, “To veil one’s face.”  
Référence D before to conclude 
6. Conclusions 
We will say for the moment simply this, that to help a patient to die without suffering, 
respecting his philosophical, religious and spiritual choices, is an integral part of the role of 
the doctor and that to refuse the help requested at any level whatsoever is at best an error 
but above all a lack of respect for others.  
Euthanasia raises and will continue to raise many questions relating to ethics, spirituality or 
even ideology. 
Although it is not possible for everyone to adhere to the same single attitude with a 
universal value, it is however inappropriate to disdain the reflective work already 
accomplished. 
The subject tackled concerns everyone even if is the act only of “some” in practice. In 
addition, on this matter it is obviously not the numbers that count. 
Euthanasia must not be considered in terms of Good or Bad, Moral or Immoral, but in terms 
of what is right, both for the individual and for society, and it is there that the ethical 
approach comes into its own. 
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Finally, it would be useful if the opponents would familiarise themselves with the reports by 
the Federal Commission for Evaluation and Control before launching into alarmist speeches, 
mentioning by-products, clandestine euthanasia, elderly people fleeing abroad, etc. 
Although medicine cannot do without morality, ethics, deontology or law, it should be 
noted that it inevitably has the nature of philosophy, in its complexity but also in its 
relevance. Although one can philosophise without being a doctor, it nonetheless seems 
inconceivable to practise medicine without philosophical reflection.  
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